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THE SUBJECTS OF A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS

Philip C. Jessup*

I

NTERNATIONAL law is generally defined or described as law
applicable to relations between states. States are said to be the
subjects of international law and individuals only its "objects." Treatises on international law accordingly usually proceed at the very outset
to examine the nature and essential characteristics of the fictitious jural
person known as the state.
But there has welled up through the years a growing opposition to
this traditional concept. Numerous writers have attacked the dogma
from a variety of approaches. Duguit, Krabbe, and Kelsen and others
have impugned the philosophical and juridical basis of the concept.1
Georges Scelle has called th~ traditional view "une vue fausse, une
abstraction anthropomorphique, historiquement responsable du caractere
fictif et de la paralysie de la science traditionnelle du droit des gens." 2
The record of progress toward the goal of acknowledging the international legal position of the individual has been traced by many jurists.8
.Politis has graphically said: "Formerly the sovereign State was an iron
* Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia
University.
1
1DuGUIT, TRAITE DE DROIT CoNSTITUTIONNEL, 3d ed., 713 (1927); Krabbe,
"L'Idee Moderne de l'Etat," 13 HAGUE RECUEIL 1926.III.514; KRABBE, THE
MoDERN IDEA OF THE STATE (1922); KEi.SEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAw AND THE
STATE (1945).
2
"Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix," 46 HAGUE RECUEIL 1933.IV.331 at
343. Cf. Dunn, "The International Rights of Individuals," PRoc. AM. Soc. INT. L.
14, 16 (1941).
8
Cf. e.g., SEGAL, L'INDIVIDU EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PosITIF (1932);
POLITIS, THE NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1928); Le Fur, "Le Developpement Historique du Droit International," 41 HAGUE REcUEIL 1932.III.505;
TENEKIDES, L'INDIVIDU DANS L'ORDRE JuRIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL (1933); cf.
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 ff.
and 305 (1927). See also Garner, "Le Developpement et !es Tendances Recentes du
Droit International," 3 5 HAGUE REcUEIL 1931.I.609 esp. p. 695, note l; Aufricht,
"Personality in International Law," 37 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 217 ff. (1943); Pintor,
"Les Subjects du Droit International autres que les Etats," 41 HAGUE RECUEIL 1932.
III.251.
•
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cage for its citizens from which they were obliged to communicate with
the outside world, in a legal sense, through very close-set bars. Yielding to the logic of events, the bars are beginning to open. The cage is
becoming shaky and wiU finally collapse. Men will then be able to
hold free and untrammeled communication with each other across their
respective frontiers."'
This discussion starts with the hypothesis that a change in the old
fundamental doctrine has been accepted, and proceeds from that point
to consider certain modifications in the traditional body of international
law which would be desirable or ne~essary if individuals as well as
states were considered subjects of the law of nations. There is therefore no occasion here to continue the debate as to whether under
existing international law individuals are subjects of the law or only its
"destinataires." 5 Those who will may consider some of the observations here as lex lata, while others will deal with them as made de lege
f erenda. It remains true, as Sir John Fischer Williams has said, that it
"is obvious that international relations are not limited to relations between states." 6 The function of international law is to provide a legal
basis for the orderly management of international relations. The traditional nature of that law was keyed to the actualities of past centuries
in which international relations were inter-state relations. The actualities have changed; the law is changing.7 The conclusion may be that
states remain the organs for conducting even those international relations which involve individuals and it may also be true, as the same
able writer has said, that when "the world is more fully organized
politically ..• the disappearance of the State as we know it will mean
that international law will either be wholly absorbed into a general
body of law or will preserve a separate existence only as a branch of a
general system." 8 But one may also agree with him that de Madari'POLITIS, id. 30, 31.
5
Cf. SP1ROPOULOS, TRArri THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DR01T INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 42 ff. (1933) ·
6
WILLIAMS, ASPECTS oF MooERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1939) .
7
"The existence of rules of international law governing relations between states
and foreign individuals is not inconceivable, but their existence has not been proved,
and, if it should be proved, the contents of the rules will necessarily differ from those
rules which concern relations between sovereigns." FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS
AND STATE SuccESSION 582 (1931). As indicated above, this discussion assumes the
proof by way of hypothesis and proceeds to consider the content of the international
law of the future.
8
WILLIAMS, CHAPTERS oN CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS 19, 20 (1929). Cf. ScHUCKING, THE INTERNATIONAL UNION oF THE
HAGUE CONFERENCES 147, 150 (1918).
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aga's insistence that we want to supplant inter-national law by "world
law, or to use a fine Roman expression, jus gentium, le droit des
gens, the law of the World Commonwealth," involves merely a
superficial change of name. 9 The term "Modern Law of Nations" has
been used here nevertheless to suggest the point that the acceptance
of the hypothesis on which this discussion proceeds involves a break
with the past.10
For the purposes of this writing, therefore, international law or the
law of nations, must be defined as law applicable to states in their
mutual relations and to individuals in their relations with states.11
International law may also, under this hypothesis, be applicable to certain interrelationships of individuals themselves, where such interrelationships involve matters of international concern. So long, however,
as the international community is composed of states, it is only through
an exercise of their will, as expressed through treaty or agreement, or
as laid down by an international authority deriving its power from
states, that a rule of law becomes binding upon an individual. 12 When
there is created some kind of international constituent assembly or
world parliament, representative of the people of the world, and
having authority to legislate, it will then be possible to assert that international law derives authority from a source external to the states.
This would be true even though in origin it might well· be states which
agreed to the creation of such a representative legislature. The inescapable fact is that the world is today organized upon the basis of the
coexistence of states and fundamental changes will take place only
through state action whether affirmative or negative.18 The only possible alternative would be revolution on a world scale which would circumvent the existing system of states as national revolutions have cir9
AsPECTS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAw 18 and 20 (1939), and cf. his
CHAPTERS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 7, note
2 (1929).
10 Other problems which will need to be considered in connection with a modernization of the law of nations can not be covered here, but will be treated by the author
in a book to be published in 1947 by the Macmillan Company.
11 Cf. SPIROPOULOS, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 43 (1935).
12
Cf. Borchard, "The Access of Individuals to International Courts," 24 AM. J.
INT. L. 359 (1930). Many writers distinguish the individual as a subject of international law from the individual as a creator of norms; cf. e.g., Rundstein, "L'Arbitrage
International en Maitiere Privee," 23 HAGUE RECUEIL 1928.III.331; Strupp, "Les
Regles Generales du Droit de la Paix," 47 id. 1934.I.263; AKZIN, PRoBLEMES FoNDAMENTAUX DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 125 ff. (1929).
18
I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed., §§uA-C, pp. 38 ff. (1945).
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cumvented preexisting constitutional or governmental law and procedure. It is true to say that states themselves operate by virtue of the will
of individuals and that the individual is thus the ultimate source of au.thority. Yet so firmly rooted is the international state system that we
are accustomed to think in terms of the state itself as the ultimate authority and sole actor. ·
There is no novelty in the suggestion that states may delegate the
exercise of sorr1;e of their customary attributes. The classic case is that
of the European Commission of the Danube established under the
Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856. The commission was given legislative, administrative and judicial powers.14 The Central Commission
for the Navigation of the Rhine established under Article 109 of the
Final Act of Vienna of 1815 had comparable powers.15 The regulations
of these commissions were directly applicable to individuals and individual infractions of the rules were directly cognizable by the c;ommissions. Thus the international bodies dealt directly with individuals in
the same manner in which national bodies customarily deal with them.
The same remark may be made in regard to those exceptional cases
in which individuals have been given by treaty the right to appear before international tribunals.16 The notable cases are those of the Central American Court of Justice established in 1907, the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunals established by the peace treaties at the en~ of World War' I,
and the Arbitral Tribunal for dealing with the rights of minorities in
Upper Silesia under the·Geneva Convention of 1922 between Poland
and Germany. In such cases the international tribunal acted directly
upon the claim of an individual and the judgment ran in favor of the
individual. In the case of the United Nations, it is not yet clear to what
extent the powers delegated to its organs will be exercised directly
upon the individual. The measures of enforcement ordered by the Security Council may be directly applicable to individuals.11 The de14
See TENEKIDES, L'INDIVIDU DANS L'ORDRE JuRIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL 84
(1933); Hastie, "Examen de Quelques Regles du Droit International dans le Domaine
des Communications et du Transit," 40 HAGUE RECUEIL 1932.II.403 at 488 ff.;
CHAMBERLAIN, THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: DANUBE AND RHINE, c. 3,
p. 47 (1923). See also P.C.I.J. Ser. B., No. 14, Adv. Op. on Jurisdiction of European Commission.
15
Hostie, ibid.
16 The question of indivi!iuals as beneficiaries of treaty provisions is reserved for
discussion elsewhere.
17 But the national state may be the intermediary through which measures are
brought home to the individual; cf. Eagleton, "The Individual and International
Law," PRoc. AM. Soc. INT. L. 22 and 24 (1946), citing Pub. L. 264, 79th Cong.,
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velopment of the Trusteeship Council and the Commission on Human
Rights may produce similar situations. Current proposals for the
establishment of a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission may
well lead to the creation, by special treaty to which states will be
parties, of a rule-making authority which will enact rules directly binding upon individuals. Thus it may become a rule of international law
that no state shall use atomic bombs; it may also become a rule of international law that no state or· individual shall, without international
license, manufacture, possess or traffic in atomic bombs or fissionable
materials.18
States may agree to separate the legislative function from the lawenforcing function so far as international agencies are concerned. Enforcement may be left to national authorities as is customary under
treaties for the protection of fisheries, the control of the slave trade and
the traffic in narcotics. The degree of delegation does not affect the
principle. Just as a national legislature may delegate certain regulatory
authority and powers to an administrative commission or officer, so the
community of states may delegate to an international authority. Although one may in both cases trace the authority back to its original
source, the individual will deal with the immediate and not the remote
source and will regard the former as the origin of his rights and duties.111
In using the term "individual" in connection wi~h the hypothesis
here under discussion, it should be understood that various types of
groups or associations of individuals are included. International law,
particularly in claims cases, is accustomed to dealing with corporations as
"citizens" or "nationals" of states in the same way in which it deals
with natural persons. So long as national law creates these juristic
persons, international law must deal with them as individuals.20 Accordingly, under the hypothesis, corporations or partnerships may also
be subjects of international law. In th~s instance, however, the fiction
1st sess. [59 Stat. L. 619 (1945)] on enforcement of United Nations Measures by the
President.
18
See the recommendations of the report of the Atomic Energy commission to the
Security Council contemplating the definition of international crimes in connection
with the use of atomic weapons and the punishment of both persons and nations,
15 DEPT. ST. BuLL. 1090 (1946).
19
Cf. BALLADORE PALLIERE, D1R1TTO INTERNAZIONALE PuBLico 286 (1937).
20
"Every system of law that has attained a certain stage in its development seems
compelled: by the ever-increasing complexity of human affairs to add to the number of
persons provided for it by the natural world, to create persons who are not men."
I PoLLOCK and MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 1st ed., 469 (1895), quoted
by Fischer Williams in "The Legal C~aracter of the Bank for International Settlements," 24 AM. J. INT. L. 665 at 666 (1930).
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of the juristic person introduces new complications in the international
field, _since a corporation may be created under the law of State A,
may have its principal place of business in State B, may have directors
who are nationals of State C and stockholders who are nationals of
State D.21
Special mention should be made of the problem created by the
growing tendency of the state to assume and to discharge functions
which in the formative period of international law were normally considered to be the function of private interests. 2 z Where the state, for
example, sets up a government corporation to manage a fleet of merchant vessels or to operat~ a government monopoly !n matches or
tobacco, international law has tended toward the acceptance of a rule
which would distinguish the corporation from the state. The development has taken place especially in connection with the law of sovereign
immunity before the courts of another state; such immunity is denied
to government corporations in the jurisprudence of many countries.28
Even where no governmental corporation is interposed, the sovereign
character of the state has not been recognized by some courts when the
state acts as a private trader. 24 In a socialized state it would seem to be
distinctly to the advantage of the state to separate its political character
from its business functions in order that economic relations may be
carried on without the frictions and prestige considerations which may
be involved if the business is handled on a political level. Perhaps the
Soviet corporation fulfill this function. 25 It has been found useful, for
example, for European railway administrations, both public and private, to arrange their affairs through the Union of International Transport by Rail before whose arbitral tribunal no distinction is made
between the governmental and the private administration. 26 The for21 See Timberg, "Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications," 46 CoL. L. REv. 533 at 572 (1946).
22
See Friedmann, "The Growth of State Control over the Individual, and Its
Effect upon the Rules of International State Responsibility," 19 B.Y.B. INT. L. II8
(1938).
28 Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Competence of
Courts in Regard to Foreign States, Article 12 and Comment, 26 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP.
641 (1932).
.
24 See Art. I I and Comment, id. 59_7 ff. and cf. the changing view of the Supreme Court of the United States as reflected in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,, 324
U.S. 30, 65 S. Ct. 530 (1945).
25
See Hazard, "Soviet Government Corporations," 41 MICH. L. REV. 8 50
(1943).
26
See Hudson and Sohn, "Fifty Years of Arbitration in the Union of International
Transport by Rail," 37 AM. J. INT. L. 597 at 600 (1943).
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mation of international corporate bodies in finance such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and The International Monetary Fund, in the development of atomic energy as in the
proposed United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, and in other
fields may serve in international economic relations to reduce the number of instances in which private individual and public governmental
interests have clashed on the international level.21 There is a corresponding possibility that all clashes of interest would be raised at once
to the level of national interests with ensuing complications in international relations. The recognition of the international legal personality of corporate or other bodies, whether private, governmental or intergovernmental, would tend to bring their interrelationships under
normal international legal controls, exercised by appropriate international organizations and procedures which would need to be established.
Since statehood is not here an essential criterion for a subject of international law, there ceases to be any difficulty about the legal personality of various other entities. In traditional international law there
has been debate about the status of the Holy See, the great chartered
companies of an earlier period, various "semi-independent" political
entities and international organizations. The Dutch East India Company and the British East India Company had the power to make war
and peace and to conclude treaties on which their states relied as the
basis of rights. Because of the traditional concept that only states were
international persons, Judge Huber as sole Arbitrator in the Palmas
Island case between the United States and the Netherlands, felt compelled to hold that the agreements made by these companies were not
"in the international law sense, treaties or conventions capable of creating rights and obligations such as may, in international law, arise out of
treaties." But at the same time he felt impelled to attribute to them
certain legal significance which is hardly distinguishable in fact from
that which they would have had if he had called them international
law treaties 28 Under traditional international law, third states did not
27

See Timberg, "Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social, and International," 46 Cot.
L. REv. 533 at 556 (1946); Communication of the Delegation of the United States
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Sept. 24, 1946, 15 DEPT. ST. BuLL.
659 (1946); Finer, "The T.V.A.: Lessons for International Application," I.L.O.,
Studies and Reports, Ser. B, No. 37 (1944); Schmitthoff, "The International Corporation," 30 GRoT. Soc. TRANS. 165 (1945). It is interesting to note that fifteen
governments have agreed to organize a "Caribbean Tourist Development Association"
which is to be a Delaware corporation, 15 DEPT. ST. BULL. 735 (1946).
28
ScoTT, HAGUE CouRT REPORTS, 2d Ser., II5 ff. (1932); cf. LAWRENCE, THE
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 4th ed., 73 ff. (19n); WHEATON, ELEMENTS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 8th ed., 26 (1936).
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attribute the .quality of statehood to the native princes of India although, perhaps as a matter of domestic policy, the British courts
treated them as such. 29 In the United States, although the Supreme
Court has applied the international law rules concerning treaties to
agreements with the Indian tribes, their status was early determined by
Chief Justice Marshall to be that of "domestic dependent nations." 80
An international tribunal has . held that the Cayuga Indians had no
standing before it save as represented by a state.81 Under the hypothesis here taken, these entities may also be subjects of international law
as may other national minority groups which may come under the protection of special provisions in treaties.
.
Colonies and other political subdivisions have long been admitted
as members of various international unions such as the ·Universal Postal
Union, and the International Institute of Refrigeration. Und,er Article
I of the Covenant of the League of Nations they could also become
members of the League if they were "fully self-governing''; the provision was designed to provide for the membership of the British
dominions and India. This situation has necessitated fine legal distinctions since the entities were. not states and yet had a certain international
position.82 According to Schwarzenberger, "The attempts which have
been made to decide in the abstract whether entities which are not
States are subjects or objects of international law do not l~d beyond
mutually contradictory assertions. The only premise which it is safe
to state, is that the existing subjects of international law are free to extend the application of international law to any entity whom they see
fit to admit to the realm of the international legal system." 88 All such
entities are here recognized as subj;cts of international law.
There has been debate also about the status of various international
organizations.84 Whether or not the League of Nations should be considered an. international person was hotly debated, the juridical argu29
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] I Q.B. 149; Duff Development Co. v.
Kelantan, [ 1924] A.C. 797. A parallel situation is presented by the recognition of the
status of the Philippine Commonwealth in courts of the United States: Bradford v.
Chase National Bank, (D.C. N.Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 28; Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 65 S. Ct. 870 (1945).
8°Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. (30 U.S.) I at 17 (1831).
81
Great Britain (The Cayuga Indians Claim) v. United States, United StatesGreat Britain Arbitration, NIELSEN'S REPORT, pp. 307 and 272 (1926).
82
Cf. the solution of STRUPP, ELEMENTS DU DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
UNIVERSEL, EuROPEEN, ET AMERICAIN 22-23 (1927).
88
I ScHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1945).
84 Cf. Brierly, "Le Fondement du Caractere Obligatoire du Droit International,
23 HAGUE RECUEIL 1928.III.526.
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ments reflecting the political controversy over the question whether
the League was to be considered a "super-state." 85 Sir John Fischer
Williams calls attention to the striking case of the international personality of the Reparations Commission established under the Treaty of
Versailles. Once created by states, the commission enjoyed a large
degree of independence. It could not be ordered by the Allied Governments "not to give Germany 'a Just opportunity to be heard.' " A delegate to the commission was not in legal contemplation the agent of his
government and was not paid by his government; he could be recalled
by his government, but his acts were not subject to governmental ratification. The judicial decisions of the commission bound the states, and
majority rule applied in reaching decisions.86
In the formation of the various United Nations organizations, it
has become customary to insert in their constitutions or charters some
reference to their legal status. Thus, for example, Article XV of the
Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization provides:
"The Organization shall have the capacity of a legal person to perform
any legal act appropriate to its purpose which is not beyond the powers
granted to it by this Constitution." 87 In general, the history of the
drafting of these provisions suggests that th~ drafters were concerned
chiefly with the legal status of such organizations under national law;
could they take title to real and personal property, make contracts, and
sue in national courts? In regard to the United Nations Organization
itself, there was evident a distinct reluctance to include in the Charter
85

"The League of Nations appeared before the Court of Appeal of Geneva as an
'international organism' enjoying privileges and immunities exempting it from the
jurisdiction of local courts." ALLEN, THE Pos1TI0N OF FoREIGN STATES BEFORE
NATIONAL CouRTS 6 (1933). See also PFANKUCHEN, A DocUMENTARY TEXTBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (1940).
86
"A Legal Footnote to the Story of German Reparations," l 3 B.Y.B. INT. L.
9 at 34 (1932). See·also the same author's article, "The Legal Character of the Bank
for International Settlements," 24 AM. J. INT. L. 665 (1930), and HuDsoN, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 67 (1944), where the Bank for lnternationaJ. Settlements is also mentioned in the same connection as having the right under
treaties to appear as a party before international tribunals.
87
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Report of the First
Session of the Conference, 1945, p. 87. Cf. Art. 47 of the Convention of the International Civil Aviation, 1944, Dept. of State Pub. 2282, p. 72; Art. 66 of the Constitution of the· World Health Organization, Final Acts of the International Health Conference, 1946, U. N. Doc. E/155; Art. IX of the Artides of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and Article VII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Dept. of State Pub. 2187, pp. 42 and
88; Article XII of the Constitution of UNESCO, Dept. of State Pub. 2457, p. 21,
Article 73 of the suggested Charter for an international Trade Organization of the
United Nations, Dept. of State Pub. 2598, p. 44.
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any provision relative to the international status of the organization.
Thus Article 104 merely provides: "The Organization shall enjoy in
the territory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purpose."
The subcommittee of Committee IV/2 of the San Francisco Conference
in reporting this text, stated: "As regards the question of international
juridical personality, the Subcommittee has considered it superfluous to
make this the subject of a text. In effect, it will be determined implicitly from the provisions of the Charter taken as a whole." 88
Yet under Article 43 it is clear that the organization may make
agreements with states and there is no reason to believe that the agreement-making power will not be exercised also in other connections as,
for example, the current proposals for an agreement between the
United Nations and the state in which its headquarters are to be located.89
As Borchard has suggested, we now have "autonomous corporations
formed under a constitution which assures their perpetuity, grants them
immunities from taxation and other local burdens, and yet subjects
them to judicial responsibility for their business activities .... These are
no longer mere agencies of the constituent states, hampered by the
unanimity rule of sovereignty...." 40
The reasons why international organizations do not have a locus
standi before the International Court of Justice are more political than
juridical. The Statute of the Court retains the provision in Article 34
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice that
only states may be parties in cases before the Court. A determined
effort was made in the United Nations Committee of Jurists which
drafted the Statute in Washington, and later in Committee IV/ I of the
San Francisco Conference, 'to amend this article so as to permit intergovernmental organizations to have direct access to the Court as
parties.41 The International Labor Organization was the body which
88 See Reiff, "Work of the United Nations 'Legal Committees,'" 15 DEPT. ST.
BULL. 3 at 12 (1946); Preuss, "The International Organization Immunities Act,"
40 AM. J. INT. L. 332, 341 (1946).
89 See U. N. Doc. A/67, September 1, 1946, p. 23.
40
•
Borchard, "Relation of Bretton Woods Agreements to Other Types of International Organization," INSTITUTE ON MoNEY AND THE LAw, N.Y. Univ. L. Q. Rev.
Supp., 99 at I IO ( 1945). Cf Sumberg, "Financing International Institutions," 13
SocIAL RESEARCH 276, 278 (1946).
H 14 Doc. of U. N. Conf. on Int. Org., San Francisco, 133 ff. (1945); 13 id.
233, 270 (1945).
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naturally came first to mind in this connection and the relations between it and the Soviet Union had not then been brought into adjustment. Under the Statute of the Permanent Court, the ILO was to
be at liberty to furnish information in contentious labor cases but no
such case arose. In advisory proceedings, international organizations
were permitted to furnish information "and even to take part in the
oral proceedings which were almost invariably held." 42 The committee vote in both Washington and San Francisco was against the proposals for amending Article 34 but the door was left open for international organizations, if authorized by the General Assembly, to
request advisory opinions.48 Under Articles 34 and 66 of the new
statute, international organizations may furnish information to the
Court in appropriate cases. The United Nations itself, represented by
its Security Council or General Assembly 44 may request advisory
opinions as could the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations
under the old statute, but the United Nations could not be a party to
a contested case before the Court. The result has no significance in
law or logic relating to the legal personality of international organizations. The consequence of the reluctance to accord them standing
before the International Court of Justice is revealed by a provision in
the Working Draft of the proposed "Convention/Agreement between
the United Nations and the United States of America" relative to the
location of the United Nations headquarters in the United States.
Under Article 38 of the Draft, disputes concerning interpretation or
application are to be referred to a special tribunal of three arbitrators,
the third member in case of deadlock to be selected by the President of
the International Court of Justice.45
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY

•

The fact that such individuals, groups or bodies have legal personality and are subjects of international law does not necessarily imply
that they have equal rights and duties. A fundamental document such
as the Charter of the United Nations may confine membership in that
42

HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 68-69 (1944).
Article 96 of the Charter, 15 Doc. of U. N. Conf. on Int. Org. 352 (1945).
44 The Economic and Social Council was given the right to request advisory
opinions by a resolution of the General Assembly adopted on December 11, 1946 under
the authority of Article 96 of the Charter. U. N. Doc. A/201.
45
U. N. Doc. A/67, September 1, 1946, p. 23. See also Domke, "The Settlement of Disputes in International Agencies," I THE ARBITRATION JouRNAL (N.S.)
1 45•
43

•
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organization to states, thus excluding from member&hip individuals,
corporations, and various types of dependencies.46 But another instrument of like origin may create an international organization composed
of states, dependencies and corporations or individuals. A treaty would
thus no longer be properly defined as an agreement between states; it
may be an agreement between a state and an individual. The criterion
distinguishing a treaty fro11:1: what has usually heretofore been called a
contract, is whether the agreement imposes obligations and confers
rights under international or under municipal law. There have been
examples of agreements between states which were municipal law contracts as, for instance, the usual type of contract of State A to purchase
land from State B for the erection of an embassy and some loan contracts such as the Inter-Allied loans of World War I which are couched
in terms of municipal law and not of interllatioD;al law.41 A concession
contract from a state to a national (individual or corporation) of another state or to a stateless person may also, under our hypothesis be
an international law agreement, thus eliminating the type of controversy revealed in certain decisions of Mixed Claims Commissions.48
Special international tribunals may be established for the adjudication
of controversies arising out of such contracts between a state and an individual and other international tribunals may be open only to states
as is prescribed by Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice.
It is thus apparent that much of the existing law concerning the
· nature and qualifications of states as international persons is still
pertinent, regardless of the acceptance of the hypothesis that individuals are also subjects of the same law. But certain concepts stand in
need of clarification. The principle of the equality of states is among
the principles which need to be reappraised. In saying that states are
equal, the assumption is implicit that all the subjects of international
law enjoy equality, one with the other. As Dickinson has pointed out,
this statement is true of equality in the sense of "equality before the
law" or "equal protection of the law" which is a matter of status, but
not necessarily true of equality used in the sense of "equality of capac46 But see Kelsen, "Membership in the United Nations," 46 CoL. L. REV. 391
· at 392 (1946), on the question whether the original members of the United Nations
are all states.
47 See Mann, "The Law Governing State Contracts," 1944 B.Y.B. INT. L. II
(1944).
.
48
,
See. Judge Nielsen's dissent in United States of America on behalf of International Fisheries Company v. United Mexican States, NIELSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLIED TO RECLAMATIONS 520 (1933).
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ity for rights," which he notes is not essential to the reign of law."9
Dickinson's sense, equality would still appertain to all subjects of international law, whether individuals or states; both would enjoy the
equal protection of the law. But the actual existing inequalities of
capacity for rights which is apparent in the present international state
system, would continue and be sharpened with reference to the differences between states and individuals.
As is also true in the case of other parts of international law, the
writings on the subject of equality often fail to distinguish between the
legal principle and the political maxim. There was an historical period
in which the doctrine of equality of states had to make its way as the
national state emerged in Europe out of the collapse of the empire, but
for a century at least, statesmen and international politicians have been
able to assert the existence of the principle without fear of verbal contradiction but with some certainty that while equality is preached,
inequality will be practiced. The international problem of equality is
the result of the coexistence of two facts:
I. States are not factually equal; their power differs;
2. States have "feelings" and the psychological factor can not be
ignored in international politics.
Power may be overcome by superior power or checked by an equivalence of power. From this principle there has evolved in the interest of
maintaining the peace, the plan of the balance of power. Power may
be surrendered and from this principle stem plans for disarmament,
for an international police force, and for a world state. Power may be
utilized by those who have it for the general advantage of the international community as a result of a conviction of self-interest in such
utilization. This is the theoretical basis of the United Nations Charter
which recognizes the existence of power and entrusts its exercise, under
agreed limitations, to those who possess it.
Just as within states the last hundred years reveals a growth of
social consciousness and of a public conscience, so has it been, in lesser ,
degree, in the international community. Contrasting the Congress of
Vienna of r 8 r 5 and its aftermath with the Paris Peace Conference of
r 9 r 9 and its aftermath, one finds in both situations the original domi-

In

°'9 DrcKmsoN, THE EQUALITY oF STATES 1N INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 (1920).
As Kelsen, "Membership in the United Nations," 46 CoL. L. REV. 391 at 398
(1946), points out, Article 35 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes the principle of equality between members of the United Nations and non-members by requiring that conditions on which the court is to be open to "other states" shall
not "place the parties in a position of inequality before the Court."
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nance of the Great Powers, but in the latter period, as the League of
Nations developed, there is a growing participation, and, comparatively, a growing influence of the middle and small powers commanding a world audience through the Geneva forum: Moving on to the
San Francisco Conference of 1945 and the early stages of the United
Nations, one observes that the voice of the middle and small powers is
louder, more insistent and, again comparatively, more productive of
results.
The psychological factor may properly be called the prestige factor.
This is not universally true, as for txample when the small riparian
states on the Danube have demanded representation on a river commission with a view to exercising at least some influence over decisions
which vitally affect them. Here a legal interest may be involved and
appeal made to the legal principle of equality before the law. But the
insistence of certain diminutive states at the Hague Peace Conference
of r 907 for permanent and equal representation on the bench of the
proposed International Court of Arbitral Justice, was inuch less genuinely a reflection of legal interest than of prestige considerations.
As one examines the manifestations of the doctrine of equality of
states in international relations, one seems to detect the emergence of a
notion that it does no violence to the doctrine if unequal rights or privileges are accorded on the basis of a formula which fairly reflects a
recognizable degree of interest. One may compare, the United States
constitutional doctrine that a reasonable classification of persons affected
saves a statute from doing violence to the constitutional guarantee of
the equal protection of the laws. Examples of this emergent notion are
abundant in connection with various international organizations. For
instance, in the International Institute of Agriculture, voting was de. termined by membership in one of five classes, members of Class I having five votes and members of Class V having one vote. Equality was
admitted in the sense that each state was free to choose the class to
which it wished to belong, but membership in Class I involved an
assessment of I 6 units of the budgetary base, and membership in Class
V involved the assessment of only one unit.5° A comparable plan in the
Bretton Woods agreement led states to seek a larger allotment of
shares in the Fund in order to be entitled to larger credit facilities, and
to avoid larger allotments of shares in the Bank with resulting larger
obligations to subscribe capital.
It is relatively easy to find formulae for inequalities in voting
50

A similar plan had been utilized in the agreement of December, I 907 creating
the International Office of Public Health.
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power and in representation in technical international organizations
where interest can be measured by statistics or factual criteria. It is
supremely difficult to find acceptable formulae in political organizations
where the prestige factor and problems of political existence may be at
stake. Great powers have power because they are great and not because
a skilful draftsman has invented an ingenious formula. The platform
of the League to Enforce Peace in I 9 I 8 suggested that "The representation of the different nations in the organs of the League should be in
proportion to the responsibilities and obligations they assume." This
suggestion is not dissimilar to the actual basis of five-great-power control of the Security Council of the United Nations. The provisions of
the Charter on regiond arrangements reflect in large part the wide
concessions which the United States in pursuance of the Good Neighbor
Policy has actually made to the principle of political equality in the
Americas. The United Nations organization is affirmed by the Charter
to be "based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members" but no one can deny that unequal rights, privileges and responsibilities are also recognized throughout the Charter. 51 Some of
the factual inequalities are based on the more readily measurable types
of interest as in the composition of the Trusteeship Council. Some, as
in the voting formula for the Security Council, are based upon the inescapable fact of power differentials. It is true, as Woodrow Wilson
said, that "all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world";
it is not true that all can make equal contribution to its maintenance. 62
The doctrine of equality of states has been championed by small
states and their spokesmen. It is they who see in it a safeguard against
encroachments by the greater powers. The great powers have their
divisions among themselves within their small circle, but in a major
sense the conflict of interest in terms of designing international organization or world government, has been between the great powers on the
one side and the small and middle powers on the other. When the
151

In his fable, ANIMAL FARM (1946), George Orwell describes the amendment
of the animals' principle "All Animals are Equal" by the addition of the words "But
Some Animals are More Equal than Others." The Charter might realistically be
amended in the same way.
152
The above discussion of equality is based largely upon the writer's introduction
to a series of studies on the subject prepared in the graduate seminar in International
Law at Columbia University; Peterson, "The Equality of States as Dogma and Reality,"
60 PoL. Sex. Q. 527 (1945). Herrera, "Evolution of Equality of States in the InterAmerican System," 61 id. 90 (1946). The writer has also had the benefit of other
unpublished studies of the seminar, especially Lande, "Revindication of the Principle
of Legal Equality of States in the Period between the Franco-Prussian War and the
First World War."
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international community lacked any form of internationally democratic.
organization, there was no other safeguard to which the smaller powers
could appeal. 58 With the development of international organization,
even in the still relatively primitive form which the United Nations
takes, there is a possibility that the function of equality .as a legal and
political principle may be fulfilled by a doctrine of community interest,
the acceptance of which is taken as a second hypothesis in this discussion. Given the forum of the General Assembly and also of the Security Council to which any state may appeal, and given the extension of
the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, all operating on the basis of the acceptance of the
principle of community interest in the maintenance of a developed law
of nations, the safeguards of the international organization may suffice
to protect the legal interests of all subjects of international law,
whether states or individuals. Thus all subjects of the law would be
guaranteed equal protection of the law although equal capacity for
rights would still differ with factual criteria. The prestige factor
would still need to be taken into account as a matter of international
politics as is true in any social relationships, but it would tend to become
more clearly recognized in its true light, stripped of confusion with the
sound legal principle of equality. States would still seek the prestige of
representation on various international commissions and other bodies
but progress could be made along the lines of the development of an international civil service in which individuals would be selected on the
basis of their competence rather than on the basis of state representation .. The formula already in use in UNRRA and in the Charter
(Article IOI )-"Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible"-would
still represent a sound principle of administrative organization.
The acceptance of the adaptation of the legal principle of equality
of states to the principle of equality of subjects of the law, whether
states or individuals, is necessary to the development of new doctrines
of human rights under the Charter of the United Nations, a subject
which cannot be treated within the scope of this article.
·
It is not impossible to accord equal protection of the law to states
and to individuals when these two different subjects of international law
appear before an international forum. The experiment has been tried
with some success in the special regime for the protection of the minori158 As Lande, ibid., points out, the small states have at times been the beneficiaries
of the rivalries among the great powers.

1 947]

SUBJECTS OF LAW OF NATIONS

399

ties in Upper Sil!!sia. Kaeckenbeeck, in his excellent analysis of this
regime says: "Even when, as a result of what is almost a fiction, a
State and a private person stand side by side as parties before an
international tribunal-a new and still quite exceptional departure-it
is essential that the impartiality of the judge should not be affected
by the difference in the importance of the parties, if I may put it in this
way, and in this connection it is essential that the judge should treat the
parties as equals. But from another standpoint, if we are not to lose.
touch with reality, it must be admitted that the interests of a State
and the interests of an individual are not on the same level, and
further, that the feelings of a nation, with their consequences, both national and international, are not commensurate with the psychological
and material satisfaction which an individual receives when his strict
rights are recognized." 54 He notes that in the matter of costs of .the judicial or arbitral procedure, for example, the state is in a very different
position from the individual and that "costly justice .•. would upset the
balance very strongly in favour of the State." Similarly in the matter
of language, which is always a difficulty for any international body,
states are in a position to hire skillful attorneys to plead in any required
language, while the individual would be at a complete loss unless his
own language could be used. 55 Kaeckenbeeck's observations are directed
to a pioneering experiment in the field of international recognition of
individual rights and it was essential to the success of that experiment
that compromise and adjustment should play a large part. Similarly in
connection with the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established under the
Peace Treaties at the end of World War I, it has been noted that while
the individual could appear in his own right before the tribunal, there
was no procedure open to him for the collection of a judgment rendered in his favor save through the assistance of his government.56 As
the law develops and the world community becomes more familiar
with the problem and its possible solutions, the difficulties will tend
to minimize themselves although they may never be wholly obliterated. One difficulty inherent in the minority regimes was that they
were imposed only on certain countries and did not represent a principle accepted by the whole world and notably by the great states.
H KAECKENBEECK, THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIMENT OF UPPER SILESIA 78
(1942). Cf. in the same sense TENEKIDES, L'INmvrnu DANS L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL 35 (1933).
55
KAECKENBEECK, id. 500.
58
Bliihdorn, "Le Fonctionnement et la Jurisprudence des Tribunaux Arbitraux
Mixtes Crees par les Traites de Paris," 41 HAGUE RECUEIL 1932.III.141.
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When the position of the individual is internationally recognized and
the rights of man are placed under international protection against
both the small and the great states, equality before the law may be insisted upon with respect both to states and to individuals.
It has been said that "big commercial and industrial enterprises increasingly often deal with States on a footing of complete equality"
and the arbitration between the Lena Goldfields Company Ltd. and
the Soviet Union has been cited in this connection. 57 In some instances
the private corporation may even be factually in a more advantageous
position than the government with which it deals. 58 The necessity for
considering the problem of equality in such international commercial
relationships would take a different form but would not be eliminated
if there should be "international incorporation of private business firms
conducting operations on an international or world scale.5°
If the foregoing be now factually true regarding the relations between private corporations and states, there is no reason why a modern
law of nations should not embody the result in an appropriately qualified rule of law. A fortiori, equality between states and international
organizations presents no legal difficulty if both are considered subjects
of the law of nations.
A modern law of nations must also take account of the principle· of
equality as applied to relations between and among individuals who are
nationals of different states whether those states be "sovereign" equals
or political subdivisions of a world government. Some aspects of traditional international law are illuminating in this connection even
though they have been conceived in terms of inter-state rights and
duties with respect to individuals characterized as citizens and aliens.
In the history of the law of responsibility of states for injuries to
aliens it has been urged, notably by Latin-American jurists, that the
standard of treatment of aliens should be equality with nationals. This
standard has been accepted by some other states, such as the United
States, only as a minimum. This latter point of view is supported by
invoking the doctrine of the international standard. Thus it is maintaineq. that if the treatment of nationals in Country X falls below the ·
57
l ScHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 215 (1945). The Arbitral award
in this case is summarized in Ann. Dig. of Pub. Int. L. Cases, Case No. l (1929-1930).
58
The United Fruit .Company might be suggested as an example; see KEPNER,
SocIAL ASPECTS OF THE BANANA INDUSTRY (1936) and sources there cited; also
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 S. Ct. 5u (1909).
59 Studies of the need for and methods of such incorporation were suggested by the
delegation of the United States to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on
September 24, 1946, 15 DEPT. ST. BuLL. 659 (1946).
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minimum standard, equality of treatment is no defense to a claim on
behalf of an injured alien. 60
In commercial treaties there is a standard clause known as the
national treatment clause, much used especially in connection with
shipping, which assures to the nationals of one contracting party
equality with the nationals of the other in specified matters.61 Such
national treatment clauses are to be contrasted with most-favored-nation clauses which use as a standard equality with the most favorable
treatment accorded to nationals of another state.132
The same principle of legal equality is to be found in the law restraining states from certain types of discrimination. This is a subject
upon which adequate monographic studies are lacking but certain
examples may be noted. 68 Thus the United States Immigration Act of
1924 was questioned by various foreign governments on the ground
that it contained improper discrimination against their nationals. The
Japanese objection was specifically based on the ground that the proposed law was "obviously aimed against Japanese as a nation." 04
By no means are all examples of discriminatory treatment illegal
under international law; states have wide latitude to accord or withhold special privileges and this latitude may be used for bargaining
purposes. The British-American Claims Commission under the Treaty
of August 18, 19m, properly refused to award compensation even
under its equity powers when the United States had compensated some
but not all cable companies damaged by its cutting submarine cables
during the Spanish-American war-the original destruction having
00

See Jessup, "Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals," 46 CoL. L.
REV. 903 (1946). But the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on Rights and Duties of
States declares in Article 9: "Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection
of the law and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other
or more extensive than those of nationals." U.S. TR. SER., No. 881.
61
See McCLURE, A NEw AMERICAN COMMERCIAL Poucy 62 (1924); Cutler,
"The Treatment of Foreigners," 27 AM. J. INT. L. 225 at 226 (1933). Cf. Art.
15 of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, International Civil
Aviation Conference, Dept. of State Pub. 2282, p. 59 ( 1944).
62
"The most favored nation clause embodies the principle of equality of treatment in international economic relations." Snyder, "The Most Favored Nation Clause
and Recent Trade Practices," 55 PoL. Sci. Q. 77 ( I 940). Cf. Article 8, Suggested
Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations, Dept. of State
Pub. 2598 (1946).
68
See id., Articles 21 and 22.
64 The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, April 10, 1924, [ I 924]
2 U. S. FoR. REL. 369 at 372; The Secretary of State to President Coolidge, May 23,
1924, ibid. 39. Cf. GARIS, IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION 263 ff., 349 (1927); FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAw 177 (1924).
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been a lawful exercise of belligerent rights. 65 A tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 1904 held in the Venezuelan Preferential Claims case that the three countries, Germany, Great Britain and
Italy, which had resorted to force to compel Venezuela to pay the
claims of their nationals, were entitled to priority over other creditor
states in the distribution of ear-marked Venezuelan assets. 66
InequaliW or discrimination as between local and foreign creditors
particularly in bankruptcy proceedings has been so widely recognized
as an injurious trade barrier that numerous bipartite and multipartite
treaties have dealt with the matter. The fact that in many of these
instances the distinctions a;e based on residence rather than on nationality is illustrative of the point that the merging of the sovereign state
system into a worId government would not be a panacea and would not
eliminate the need for international law. There is a sufficient 11nanimity
in the views expressed by various international bodies, business and
legal, governmental and private, to warrant the devotion of early attention to this problem when the proposed International Trade Organization is established. As has been suggested, such an effort might well
proceed on the principle stated by Mr. Justice Jackson that "we cannot
successfully cooperate with the r.est of the world in establishing a reign
of law. unless we are prepared to have that law sometimes operate
against what would be our national advantage." 67
INDEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Independence is another quality or characteristic which states are
commonly said to possess under international law. Historically this
concept has been convenient because it helped to differentiate those po65
Great Britain (Eastern Extension, Australasia & China Telegraph Co. Claim) v.
United States, NIELSEN'S REPORT, 73 (1923).
In his argument before the tribunal, Wayne McVeagh as counsel for the United
States said: "It is not enough that the conduct of the allies in making war upon
Venezuela was equally meritorious with the policy pursued by the other creditor nations in abstaining from war and in seeking to collect the claims presented by them by
peaceful methods. Before you can award preferential treatment to their claims, you
· must declare their conduct to be more meritorious than the conduct of those nations
which abstained from making war; for equality of treatment is the rule and preferential
treatment can only be accorded as an award of merit." The Venezuelan Arbitration
before The Hague Tribunal, 1903, S. Doc. 119, 58th Cong., 3d sess., p. 1133.
66
ScoTT, THE HAGUE CouRT REPORTS 55 ( 19 I 6).
67
Nadelmann, "Legal Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors," I I L.
AND CoNTEM. PRoB. 696 at 709 (1946), quoted from Jackson, "The Rule of Law
Among Nations," PRoc. AM. Soc. lNT••L. 18 (1945). Nadelmann's article is an excellent discussion of the whole subject and contains ample citations on the points which
have been noted here.
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litical groupings which determined their own policies, especially in international relations, from those which acknowledged a certain subordination to other groups. Only fully independent groups were considered to be "states" although the terms "semi-independent state" and
even "sovereign dependency" have had currency. The doctrine had
additional importance, however, as a basis for those rules of international law which sought to restrict interferences by one state in the ·
affairs of another. An interference in the affairs of a vassal, a protectorate, a colony, or other unit which was in a position of political subordination to a state, might be justified by that relationship whereas it
would not be justified if the other unit were also an independent state.
The doctrine of independence of states is thus also linked to the development of a legal system for the protection of the weak against the
strong and in this respect it is akin to the doctrine of equality. To that
extent, the acceptance of the principle of community interest and the
perfection of forms of international organization will_ tend to diminish
the importance of the concept of independence although it will remain
one of the criteria for identifying a state in cases where that classification retains its importance. In this connection Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations with its "Declaration Regarding Non-SelfGovetning Territories" and Chapters XII and XIII on the Trusteeship System and the Trusteeship Council are significant indications of
the acceptance which has already been accorded to the community interest in non-independent groups.
It may be suggested that it would be more conformable both to the
realities and to the desiderata of the international community, if instead
of emphasizing that each state is independent of every other, it were
frankly asserted that each state is dependent on all other states, linked
together in the society of nations or in a world government. But the
terms "dependent" and "dependence" have connotations which would
clearly make them inacceptable in this connection. The same thought is
conveyed by the acceptance of the hypothesis of community interest.
The thought might be expressed concisely by saying that every state
has the quality of "interdependence" with every other state. Interdependence would connote both rights and duties. The rights would include respect for its territorial integrity and its safety and observance
toward it by all other states of the rules of international law designed
for mutual well-being. The duties would include the obligation to
accord to other states reciprocal respect and observance.
The acceptance of a general concept of community interest, or interdependence, has been referred to a~ a secohd hypothesis upon which
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this discussion proceeds. Briefly, the new concept would imply an
abandonment of the traditional theory as stated by Judge Story that if
a state violates international law, this is a wrong of which only the state
directly injured may complain.68 In a sense this change would be
comparable to substituting for the present "tort" basis of international
law, a basis more comparable to that of criminal law in which the community takes cognizance of law violations. In other instances, however,
the change would be a shift in the direction of more-extended governmental functions of an organized international community as in case
processes of collective recognition should be substituted for the present
unilateral action. 69
Limited interdependence, through cosignature of multipartite
treaties is a familiar aspect of traditional international law. For example, Paragraph I of Article 386 of the Treaty of Versailles provided
that "In the event of violation of any of the conditions of Articles 380
to 3 86, or of disputes as to tjie interpretation of these articles, any
interested Power can appeal to the jurisdiction instituted for the purpose by the League of Nations." This provision was quoted by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in its first Judgment in the
case of the S.S. Wimbledon, involving the right of free passage provided by the treaty as the regime for the Kiel Canal. A refusal of passage to a French vessel was the subject of proceedings against Germany
before the Court. The proceedings were instituted jointly by France,
Great Britain, Japan and Italy, and Germany raised the question as to
whether such joint application was proper inasmuch as. only France
could "adduce a prejudice to any pecuniary interest." The Court held
that the joint application was proper since "each of the four Applicant
Powers has a clear interest in the execution of the provisions relating to
the Kiel Canal, since they all possess fleets and merchant vessels flying
their respective flags." 10 If the legal quality of interdependence were
recognized, the same reasoning could be applied to the interest of any
maritime state in a question involving the freedom of the seas or the
navigation of an international river and it would not be necessary to
show that the state asserting the interest was a party to any treaty which
might be involved. This would mark a clear change from the traditional position which has been well stated by Verdross in saying that
the "merely ideal interest of the other states in maintaining the inter68

United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, (C. C. Mass. 1822) Fed. Cas. No. 15,551.
Cf. Postulate 4 of THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE FUTURE, A.B.A.J. Pub.,
32 (1944).
70
P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1, p. 20 (1931).
69
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national legal order is ... insufficient" to support a claim to act. But he
admits there may be exceptional cases where the general interest is involved as when some state embarks on a career of lawlessness.71 Upon
the acceptance of the concept of interdependence, the exception would .
become the rule. 72
Tentative assertion of such a right in connection with the common
interest of all neutral states in the upholding of the law of neutral
rights is to be found in the views expressed by several European governments in connection with Trent Affair in r86I. 78 The same thought
was utilized in various proposals for armed neutralities or leagues of
neutrals.7~
The history of the Concert of Europe throughout much of the
nineteenth century is illustrative of the acceptance of a concept of interdependence as a legal norm in international relations at least so far as
the affairs of the European continent were concerned. It is true that
this instrument was wielded by the Great Powers, often for selfish ends
and that they tended to ignore the rights of the small powers. But as
the action of the Concert was frequently rationalized and defended,
there was an invocation of a concept of community interest, of interdependence. Procedurally, the Great Powers asserted their right to act
as the instruments of the public law of Europe. Thus Lord Salisbury
defended the action of the Concert in respect of Greece by referring to
"the federated action of Europe" enacting rules as a "legislature" in
the interests of European peace. 75 Numerous discussions and agreements concerning the neutralization of Switzerland, and other areas
reflect the acceptance of the concept of interdependence.76 The famous
71
VoLKERRECHT 165 (1937), citing Vattel and Hefter in accord on these exceptional cases.
72
Garner in 1925 argued that states should have "an admitted legal right to protest against violation of the law'' even where no immediate injury could be shown;
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 814.
78
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Rights and
Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, Art. 114, commentary, 33 AM. J.
INT. L. SUPP. 788 ff. (1939); French Statement in 55 BR. & FoR. S. P. 6rn-612, and
(1862] U.S. FoR. REL. 307; Austrian position in 55 BR. & FoR. S. P. 618 and German statement, id. 624; also British summary of these views, id. 641 ff.
7
~ See 4 JESSUP, NEUTRALITY, ITS HISTORY, EcoNoMics AND LAw, ToDAY AND
ToMORROW 160 ff. (1936); Biilow to Lord Granville, Aug. 31, 1870, FoNTES JURIS
GENTIUM, Ser. B, Sectio I, Tom. I. Pars 1, 2.
711
Address in the House of Lords quoted in I WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
2d ed., 322 (1910); cf. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 7th
ed., 250 (1923).
76
See General Act of the Congress of Vienna, June 9, 1815, Articles IX,
LXXXIV, XCII, 2 BR. & FoR. S. P. 3 (1915); cf. Peterson, "The Equality of States
as Dogma and Reality," 60 PoL. Sci. Q. 527 at 547 (1945).
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declaration in the treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856 is comparable in
its pronouncement that the Sublime Porte was admitted to participate
in the advantages of the public law and Concert of Europe. The signa. tory powers accordingly agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and said that they would
consider any act tending to violat~ this engage~ent as a question of
_general interest. 77 The joint interest of the powers in the "open door"
for China and respect for Chinese territorial integrity may also be
noted. The concept of interdependence is clearly recognized in the
Covenant of the Lea~e of Nations and in the Charter of the United
Nations. 78
An interesting assertion of the right of a state to secure satisfaction
because of the injury it sustains through the weakening of the international legal system through any breach of a rule of international law
was made by the French Government in its case against Italy before a
tribunal of the Permanent Cour-t of Arbitration in the cases of the
Carthage and the Manouba. These two French ships had been captured by the Italians during their war with Turkey; the French claims
for indemnity were submitted to arbitration. In addition to material
compensation for the damage to the vessels, the French Government
asked for the "sum of one hundred thousand francs as reparation for.
the moral and political injury resulting from the failure to observe
international common law .and conventions binding both Italy and
France." The Tribunal, correctly under the existing law, refused to
make such an awa:rd, holding that the establishment by an arbitral
tribunal of the fact ~f a breach of international legal obligations "constitutes in itself a serious penalty.mo
SoVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty, in its meaning of an absolute, uncontrolled state will,
ultimately free to resort to the final arbitrament of war, is the quicksand upon which the foundations of traditional international law are
built. Until the world achieves some form of international government
in which a collective will takes precedence over the individual will of
the sovereign state, the ultimate function of law which is the elimination of force for the solution of human conflicts, will not be fulfilled.
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46 BR. & FoR. S. P. 8 (1856).
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There must eventually be organs empowered to lay down rules-a
legislature; there must be judicial organs to interpret and apply those
rules--a judiciary; and there must be organs with power to compel
compliance with the rules so interpreted and applied--a police force.
It is not within the scope of this article to deal with these organizational
and procedural developments, but their importance is not minimized.
As in regard to the legal attribute of equality, the function of sovereignty as a legal concept was to protect the state in a world devoid of
any alternative to self-protection. The gradual development of adequate modernized law and _organization should provide such an alternative.
Because the international system has so far failed to meet the
central problem of war, it is often inaccurately assumed that no progress
has been made in the direction of limiting the free exercise of state
will. so Once it is agreed that sovereignty is divisible 81 and that it therefore is not absolute, various restrictions on and relinquishments of
sovereignty may be regarded as normal and not stigmatizing. The
slow but steady development of majority rule in international organizations 82 bears witness to the change which is taking place. Of great
significance is the contrast between the Covenant of the League of Nations which left to each member freedom to decide whether it would
participate in sanctions recommended by the Council, and Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations whereby the members relinquish
the power of decision to the Security Council and are bound to take action upon the basis of that decision. Notable also are those numerous
provisions in the Charter which recognize that the treatment of the
individual citizen is no longer a matter solely of domestic concern and
that the denial of fundamental human rights to a citizen can no longer
be shrouded behind the impenetrable cloak of national sovereignty.88
Sovereignty in the sense of exclusiveness of jurisdiction, in certain domains, and subject to overriding precepts of constitutional force, will
remain a usable and useful concept just as in the constitutional system
of the United States the forty-eight states are considered sovereign.
But sovereignty in its old connotations of ultimate freedom of national
so Cf. Postulate 3, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE FUTURE, A.B.A.J. Pub., 29
(1944); Jessup, "Force under a Modern Law of Nations," 25 FoR. AFF. 90 (1946).
81
See the practical argument to this effect in I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw,
5th ed., by Lauterpacht, § 69, p. II 6 ( I 937).
82
See RICHES, MAJORITY RuLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1940).
88
See Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation, Proceedings 21st Institute,
The United Nations and The Organization of Peace and Security, 99, 126 (1945).
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will unrestricted by law, is not consistent with the principles of community interest and of the-status of the individual as a subject of international law. With the development of international law regulating
the state's use of force and the implementation of the spirit of those
provisions of the Charter which should make any resort to war clearly
illegal, sovereignty would no Jonger constitute a major obstacle to the
development of a genuine international community. Theoretical difficulties confronting the acceptance of the supremacy of international law
would then disappear.

